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LEGAL RIGHTS IN A JUVENILE
CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTION
Although the primary objectives of the adult criminal justice
system are determination of guilt, fixation of criminal respon-
sibility, and administration of punishment, these are not the major
objectives of the juvenile criminal justice system.' The creation of
a separate set of procedures and institutions to deal with juvenile
legal problems grew from reformers' recognition of the dangers of
applying the adult penal system to juveniles. The reformers were
convinced that society has a duty to care for and rehabilitate its
youth. 2
State juvenile statutes presently reflect the benevolent, social
welfare goals of the early reformers.3 Despite these treat-
ment-oriented statutes and the increased utilization of a broad
range of therapeutic practices, 4 a large majority of American
juvenile correctional institutions continue to emphasize custody
and punishment.5 As in adult penal institutions, obedience, con-
formity, and respect for authority are stressed.6 Juvenile programs
center on regimentation of the inmates and restriction of their
I Kent v. United States. 383 U.S. 541. 554 (1966). Indeed juvenile proceedings are not
"criminal" at all. They are designed to permit civil commitment of offenders for the
purpose of treatment and rehabilitation.2 As Mr. Justice Fortas acknowledged in In re Gault, 387 U.S. I, 15 (1967):
They [early reformers] were profoundly convinced that society's duty to the
child could not be confined by the concept of justice alone. They believed
that society's role was not to ascertain whether the child was 'guilty' or
'innocent.' but 'what is he. how has he become what he is. and what had best
be done in his interest and in the interest of the state to save him from a
downward career.' . . . The child was to be 'treated' and 'rehabilitated' and
the procedures, from apprehension through institutionalization, were to be
'clinical' rather than punitive.
Id. at 16 (footnote omitted).
3 Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 554 (1966). Typical is Indiana which sets forth
the basic principle of its Juvenile Court Act as follows:
The purpose of this act [IND. STAT. ANN. §§9-3201 to -3225 (197 1)]is to
secure for each child within its provisions such care. guidance and control,
preferably in his own home. as will serve the child's welfare and the best
interests of the state; and when such child is removed from his own family, to
secure for him custody, care and discipline as nearly as possible equivalent to
that which should have been given by his parents. IND. CODE § 3 1-5-7-1
(1971).
For other examples, see District of Columbia Juvenile Court Act, D.C. CODE
ANN. § 11-1551 (1967); MICH. COMp. LAWS ANN. § 712A.2 (Supp. 1973).
4D. STREET, C. PERROW & R. VINTER, ORGANIZATION FOR TREATMENT 21 (1966).
5 BECOMING DELINQUENT 223 (P. Garabedian & D. Gibbons eds. 1970).6D. STREET, C. PERROW & R. VINTER, supra note 4, at 21.
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freedom. 7 Smooth institutional operation is primary.8 Though nu-
merous juvenile treatment institutions focus on the psychological
"reconstitution of the individual" and employ practices which
vary in many ways from the classic adult prison model, dis-
ciplinary and control concerns continue to play predominant
roles.9
As a result of two significant, recent legal developments.
post-adjudicative juvenile correctional institutions may be forced
to reexamine many of their current policies and procedures. 10
First, the courts in the last seven years have made deep inroads
into the traditional "hands-off" doctrine that has been used to
shield the actions of state correctional institution administrators
from judicial and public scrutiny. The traditional judicial restraint
exercised with respect to review of petitions alleging mistreatment
of prisoners and denial of basic rights led courts to refuse to
decide cases on the ground that the internal affairs of state prisons
are beyond the scope of the court's jurisdiction." Until recently,
this policy effectively "placed prison correction officials in a posi-
tion of virtual invulnerability and absolute power."' 2 However, a
series of cases brought predominantly by adult prisoners served to
clarify and expand the enunciated constitutional rights of prison-
ers.' 3 While the concept of the prisoner as a non-person' 4 has long
7 BECOMING DELINQUENT 223 (P. Garabedian & D. Gibbons eds. 1970).
8 Jesness, The Fricot Ranch Study, in BECOMING DELIQUENT (P. Garabedian & D.
Gibbons, eds. 1970).
1 Id. at 224.
10 Any re-examination will have a significant impact because of the number of in-
dividuals affected. In 1965, 62,773 youths were confined in juvenile institutions on a daily
average. UNITED STATES PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND THE AD-
MINISTRATION OF JUSTICE: THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY 161 (1967).
11 Typical is the Fourth Circuit's response in refusing to consider a petition concerning
prison disciplinary sanctions. See McCloskey v. Maryland, 337 F.2d 72, 74 (4th Cir.
1964) (Censorship of anti-semitic literature upheld as valid because the court declared that
no judicially enforceable right was at stake.). The court stated, "in the great mass of
instances ... the necessity for effective disciplinary controls is so impelling that judicial
review of them is highly impractical and wholly unwarranted." 337 F.2d at 74.
12 Hirschkop & Millemann, The Unconstitutionality of Prison Life, 55 VA. L. REv. 795,
813 (1969).
13 A number of courts are in agreement with the view expressed by the Supreme Court
in Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483 (1969), concerning judicial review of institutional rules
and procedures:
There is no doubt that discipline and administration of state detention facil-
ities are state functions .... It is clear, however, that in instances where state
regulations applicable to inmates of prison facilities conflict with [federal
constitutional] rights, the regulations may be invalidated.
Id. at 486.
See Washington v. Lee, 263 F. Supp. 327, 331 (M.D. Ala. 1966), aff'd, 390 U.S. 333
(1968) (invalidated a state policy of prison racial segregation); Jackson v. Godwin, 400
F.2d 529, 532-33 (5th Cir. 1968) (invalidated certain restrictive correspondence regu-
lations); UNITED STATES PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND THE AD-
MINISTRATION OF JUSTICE: CORRECTIONS 83 (1967).14 Ruffin v. Commonwealth, 62 Va. (21 Gratt) 790, 796 (1871) (Prisoner possesses no
rights normally granted a citizen.).
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been disavowed,1 5 the erosion of the "hands-off" doctrine has
finally begun to give some substance to the statement, "[a] prison-
er retains all the rights of an ordinary citizen except those ex-
pressly, or by necessary implication taken from him by law."
1 6
Second, the rights of the youth in the juvenile justice process
have begun to undergo careful re-examination after In re Gault.' 7
It is now clear that the juvenile justice system, despite its enun-
ciated beneficial purpose, is still subject to the rigors of due
process. While the court in Gault explicitly limited its holding to
the adjudicative stage of the juvenile process, several federal
courts have rejected this narrow construction.'
This article focuses on the effect on juvenile correctional in-
stitutions of the erosion of the "hands-off" doctrine and the
introduction of procedural safeguards in the juvenile justice sys-
tem. In so doing, the article examines the difficulties inherent in
any attempt to reform institutional practices and procedures to
accommodate the goals of the juvenile correctional model. In the
juvenile context, the extent to which fundamental rights need or
may be abrogated to allow the institution freedom to rehabilitate
and treat its immates is crucial. Therefore, this article examines
three areas involving fundamental constitutional rights: imposition
of punitive segregation, freedom of communication, and post-
adjudicative disciplinary proceedings. The article discusses the
"SSee, e.g., Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319 (1972) (Majority upheld the right of Buddhist
inmates to freedom of religion.).
16 Coffin v. Reichard. 143 F.2d 443. 445 (6th Cir. 1944). cert. denied, 325 U.S. 887
(1945). Recent cases have dealt with freedom of religion. Cruz v. Beto. 405 .U.S. 319
(1972): freedom from racial segregation. Lee v. Washington. 390 U.S. 333 (1968): freedom
from cruel and unusual punishment. Holt v. Sarver. 442 F.2d 304 (8th Cir. 1971): and the
right to the fourteenth amendment's guarantee of due process. Landman v. Royster. 333
F. Supp. 621 (E.D. Va. 1971).
17 387 U.S. I (1967). The parents of a fifteen-year-old boy. who was committed to the
Arizona State Industrial School as a juvenile delinquent by the county juvenile court.
petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus. The Arizona Supreme Court affirmed a lower court
dismissal of the petition. and the parents appealed to the United States Supreme Court.
The boy was taken into custody without notice to his parents; no written charges were
filed against him; the complainant was not present at the hearing; he admitted making an
obscene phone call, but the admission was made without benefit of counsel and without
advice of his right to remain silent; and finally, the boy was never advised of his right to
state-appointed counsel. Mr. Justice Fortas, writing for five members of the court, stated
that in the above particulars the boy was denied due process of law because juvenile
delinquency proceedings that may lead to commitment in a state institution must meet the
essential requirements of due process and fair treatment.
"I In Nelson v. Heyne, 355 F. Supp. 451 (N.D. Ind. 1972, Supp. Op. 1973), the court
stated, "[lit would be anomalous to find treatment and rehabilitation of an offender as
relevant goals during pre-dispositional phases of the juvenile process but not as to the
post-dispositional period." Id. at 459. The case involved the grant of injunctive relief
against the Indiana Boys School, a medium security juvenile correctional institution,
forbidding several disciplinary practices. See also Inmates of the Boys' Training School v.
Affleck, 346 F. Supp. 1354 (D.R.I. 1972); Martarella v. Kelley, 349 F. Supp. 575
(S.D.N.Y. 1972).
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traditional judicial stance regarding these issues in the adult in-
stitutional setting and suggests that each issue is affected
differently by the juvenile character of the institution's inmates,
the nature of the process by which the youth is committed, and
the treatment orientation of many juvenile correction centers.
Throughout the article the institutional need for flexibility in
choosing and carrying out treatment methods is balanced against
the need for procedural safeguards to ensure that the rehabilita-
tive purpose is carried out with respect for minimal requirements
of fairness and decency.
1. PUNITIVE SEGREGATION
A. Present State of the Law
The legality of punitive segregation'" has most frequently been
analyzed in terms of the eighth amendment's prohibition of cruel
and unusual punishment. Recent cases, which bypass the
"hands-off" doctrine to protect prisoners from such cruel and
unusual punishment, leave little question that the eighth amend-
ment applies to the treatment of prisoners as well as to the length
of their sentence.20 Nonetheless, no court has declared that segre-
gated confinement by itself violates the eighth amendment and
several courts have explicitly rejected this assertion. 21 As the
Second Circuit noted in Sostre v. McGinnis,22 "a similar form of
confinement is probably used in almost every jurisdiction in this
country .... The federal practice appears to be that prisoners
shall be retained in solitary 'for as long as necessary to achieve
the purposes intended,' sometimes 'indefinitely.' "23
Courts generally limit their corrective involvement to condi-
tions that could properly be called "barbarous" or "shocking to
19 For the purpose -of this paper punitive segregation is defined as the disciplinary
isolation of a person from human contact in a barren room, with little or no opportunity for
exercise or recreation, as distinguished from the temporary isolation of an individual who
is emotionally out of control in order to allow him to "cool off."2
°Jordan v. Fitzharris, 257 F. Supp. 674 (N.D. Cal. 1966) (enjoined solitary con-
finement in subhuman conditions); Fulwood v. Clemmer. 206 F. Supp. 370 (D.D.C. 1962)
(two years solitary confinement not "reasonably related" to the disturbance of prison
peace); Wright v. McMann, 387 F.2d 519 (2d Cir. 1967) (debasing conditions, if proved,
establish a violation of the eighth amendment). But see Ford v. Board of Managers. 407
F.2d 937 (3d Cir. 1969) (bread and water diet supplemented by one regular meal every
third day and no running water; does not state an eighth amendment claim).
21 Sostre v. McGinnis. 442 F.2d 178, 192 (2d Cir. 1971). See notes 87, 90, 98 and
accompanying text infra. See also Courtney v. Bishop. 409 F.2d 1185 (8th Cir. 1969),
cert. denied,396 U.S. 915 (1969); Landman v. Peyton, 370 F.2d 135 (4th Cir. 1966).
22442 F.2d 178 (2d Cir. 1971).
23 Id. at 19 2.
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the conscience." 24 For example, in Wright v. McMann25 the
circuit court unhesitatingly held that solitary confinement violated
the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment when a
prisoner was forced to remain nude in a stripped solitary con-
finement cell, subjected to subfreezing temperatures, and denied
all hygenic essentials. The court said that these conditions "could
only serve to destroy completely the spirit and undermine the
sanity of the prisoner." 26 Similarly, in Jordan v. Fitzharris27
where a prisoner was forced to sleep nude, allowed to wash his
hands only once every five days, and was otherwise deprived of
all items necessary to maintain bodily sanitation in his wet,
filth-encrusted cell, the district court felt that judicial intervention
was required. The court stated:
However, when, as it appears in the case at bar, the re-
sponsible prison authorities in the use of the strip cells have
abandoned elemental concepts of decency by permitting con-
ditions to prevail of a shocking and debased nature, then the
courts must intervene ... to restore the primal rules of a
civilized community in accord with the mandate of the Con-
stitution of the United States. 28
Thus, in the adult correctional setting, courts are reluctant to
limit the practice of imposed solitary confinement unless such
treatment is accompanied by an almost total lack of the amenities
to which a prisoner is deemed entitled.
B. The Legality of the Practice in a
Juvenile Setting
Given the stated benevolent statutory purpose of confinement
at juvenile correctional institutions, 29 the limited due process pro-
tections received by the youth at the adjudicatory stage in the
juvenile justice system a ° and the emerging empirical data on the
effects of solitary confinement on a juvenile who is in his most
formative years,3 1 the courts may be far less reluctant to declare a
24 See Sostre v. McGinnis. 442 F.2d 178 (2d Cir. 197 1); Wright v, McMann, 387 F.2d
519 (2d Cir. 1967); Jordan v. Fitzharris, 257 F. Supp. 674 (N.D. Cal. 1966).
25 387 F.2d 519 (2d Cir. 1967).
26 Id. at 526.
27 257 F. Supp. 674 (N.D. Cal. 1966).
28 Id. at 680.
29 See note 3 and accompanying text supra.30 McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 402 U.S. 528 (1971) (The full due process protection
required in adult criminal proceedings is not required in juvenile adjudication.).
31 WORKING PAPERS FOR THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE: CORREC-
TIONAL INSTITUTIONS. Standard 2.5 (1973). See notes 47-48 and accompanying text infra.
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specific confinement condition violative of a youth's constitutional
rights. Currently the disciplinary use of juvenile solitary con-
finement is the subject of increased judicial scrutiny,3 2 and today
there can be little doubt that merely categorizing the confinement
as rehabilitative does not preclude the operation of the eighth
amendment when the reality of the confinement becomes punitive.
In fact, more careful judicial scrutiny is called for to prevent
deviation from the goal of rehabilitation. The cautionary observa-
tion of a noted scholar bears consideration:
Measures which subject individuals to the substantial and
involuntary deprivation of their liberty fare essentially puni-
tive in character.] and this reality is not altered by the facts
that the motivations that prompt incarceration are to provide
therapy or otherwise contribute to the person's well-being or
reform. As such. these measures must be closely scrutinized
to insure that power is being applied consistently with those
values of the community that justify interferences with liberty
for only the most clear and compelling reasons. 33
Acknowledging that measures aimed at rehabilitation often
have punitive overtones, numerous courts have relied on statutory
pronouncements defining the purpose of the juvenile justice sys-
tem, to insist that juveniles be treated in a fashion consistent with
established rehabilitative goals.3 4 In an effort to enunciate a right
to treatment for juveniles incarcerated in correctional institutions,
the courts affirmed that institutionally confined juveniles possess
rights not given to adult prisoners. The courts implicitly acknowl-
edged that the juvenile's avowed possession of a right to treat-
ment often serves to justify rehabilitative incarceration. These
courts have recognized that non-treatment may be considered
cruel and unusual punishment for those held in civil custody, even
without reference to a standard proscribing inhumane conditions
of confinement.
The circuit court in Martarella v. Kelley3 5 justified its decision
to hold the state to a higher standard of care in juvenile in-
stitutions based upon its interpretation of the rehabilitative ideal.
The court wrote:
32 Martarella v. Kelley, 349 F. Supp. 575 (S.D.N.Y. 1972); Inmates of the Boys'
Training School v. Affleck. 346 F. Supp. 1354 (D.R.i. 1972); Wyatt v. Stickney, 325
F. Supp. 781 (M.D. Ala. 1971); Lollis v. New York State Dept. of Social Services, 322
F. Supp. 473 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
33 F. ALLEN, THE BORDERLAND OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 37 (1964).
34 In re Elmore, 382 F.2d 125 (D.C. Cir. 1967); Creek v. Stone, 379 F.2d 106 (D.C.
Cir. 1967); Martarella v. Kelley, 349 F. Supp. 575 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
35349 F. Supp. 575 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) (recognized right to treatment for juveniles in-
voluntarily confined by the juvenile justice system).
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Where the state, as parens patriae, imposes such detention, it
can meet the Constitution's requirement of due process and
prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment if, and only if, it
furnishes adequate treatment to the detainee.3 6
Underlying the decisions upholding a right to treatment for juve-
niles is an awareness that the anticipation of benevolent care and
treatment is the only justification for denying juveniles the full
panoply of due process protections accorded an adult during the
adjudicatory stage. It is therefore arguable that conditions which
would not be considered cruel and unusual punishment in an adult
correctional institution may be so designated in the juvenile set-
ting. In addition, juvenile adjudicatory due process may be vi-
tiated if post-adjudicatory treatment is not provided3 7
A number of court decisions examine the efficacy of forced
isolation as a measure used in the treatment of juveniles. The case
of Lollis v. New York State Department of Social Services,38
involved a petition by a fourteen-year-old girl, who was confined
as a "person in need of supervision" rather than as a delinquent,
challenging her two-week placement in solitary confinement. At
the outset the court stipulated that it recognized the state's right
to isolate temporarily a child under emergency conditions in order
to protect the child from danger and to protect others3 9 Framing
the issue in terms of the constitutionality of extended isolation or
isolation imposed on civil inmates as punishment, the court held
that two weeks of confinement in an isolation cell with no recrea-
tion facilities or reading matter is, with respect to juveniles, cruel
and unusual punishment. The district court noted that it is not
3r Id. at 585.
37 While pronouncements as to the adequacy of adjudicatory procedural safeguards are
affected by the expectation that treatment will be provided, the overall sufficiency of
treatment rendered raises post-adjudicatory due process considerations as well. The deci-
sion rendered in Wyatt v. Stickney. 325 F. Supp. 781 (M.D. Ala. 1971). is directly in
point. The court held. "To deprive any citizen of his or her liberty upon the altruistic
theory that the confinement is for humane therapeutic reasons and then fail to provide
adequate treatment violates the very fundamentals of due process." Id. at 785. In-
corporated in the opinion as Appendix A was a list of minimum constitutional standards
for adequate treatment of the mentally ill. Paragraph 11-7 of the Appendix specifically
states.
Patients have a right to be free from physical restraint and isolation except
for emergency situations, in which it is likely that patients could harm
themselves or others and in which less restrictive means of restraint are not
feasible, patients may be physically restrained or placed in isolation only on a
Qualified Mental Health Professional's written order which explains the
rationale for such action.
Thus solitary confinement found to have the status of non-treatment may be con-
stitutionally prohibited as an activity constituting a post-adjudicatory denial of due process
notwithstanding its failure to be classified as cruel and unusual punishment.
38322 F. Supp. 473 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
39 Id. at 477.
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necessary to demonstrate "barbarous acts" for a juvenile to state
a claim under 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983.40 "It is sufficient, for example,
to show .... that plaintiff was held for two weeks in isolation
which .... was 'augmented by surroundings so oppressive as to
destroy the integrity and identity of a child.' "41
Nelson v. Heyne 42 involved a class action by the inmates of an
Indiana boys' training school seeking to enjoin the use of solitary
confinement without due process safeguards. The court concluded
that isolation could not be used in the future unless the institution
could demonstrate in each case that isolation met the best treat-
ment interests of the child.43
While dealing directly with the problem of isolated confinement
of juveniles, the court in Inmates of the Boys' Training School v.
Affleck 44 stated:
[T]he Constitutional validity of present procedural safeguards
in juvenile adjudications.... appears to rest on the adherence
of the juvenile system to rehabilitative rather than penal
goals .... Thus, due process in the juvenile justice system
requires that the post-adjudicative stage of institutionalization
further the goal of rehabilitation. 45
The court refused to enjoin the allegedly unconstitutional use of
isolation cells only because the petitioner failed to present expert
testimony to demonstrate what constitutes solitary confinement
and to distinguish between acceptable and destructive segrega-
tion. However, the opinion noted the increased limitations on
freedom and educational opportunity caused by isolation and de-
clared such action to be punishment regardless of the justification
given for its use. 46
Of crucial importance is the recognition by all three courts that
solitary confinement is not rehabilitation but punishment and that
isolation is believed to have definite detrimental effects on chil-
dren. In each case, the effect of prolonged isolation on juveniles
40 The statute states:
Every person who, under color of any statute. ordinance, regulation.
custom, or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be sub-
jected, any citizen of the United States or other person within jurisdiction
thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges or immunities secured by
the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at
law, suit in equity. or other proper proceeding for redress.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1971).
41 322 F. Supp. at 478.
42355 F. Supp. 451 (N.D. Ind. 1972).
43 Id. at 456.
44346 F. Supp. 1354 (D.R.I. 1972).
45 Id. at 1364.46 d. at 1368, 1369.
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was the subject of extensive expert testimony. The consensus that
emerged from the expert testimony indicates that the uncon-
scionably cruel practice of forced isolation serves no constructive
treatment purpose and is actually punitive in its effect, stifling
emotional development and causing behavior to deteriorate rather
than improve. 47 The experts concluded that since the seclusion of
a juvenile produces far more serious psychological repercussions
than similar measures administered to adults, prolonged isolation
can never be considered beneficial to the juvenile recipient. 48
47 The testimony of Dr. Robert Gould in Lollis, 322 F. Supp. at 481 is representative.
[lit is unconscionably cruel and inhumane treatment to put an adolescent in
isolation for a two week period. In fact one day of such isolation would not
constitute constructive action to rehabilitate a troubled youngster....
Isolation as a 'treatment' is punitive, destructive, defeats the purposes of
any kind of rehabilitation efforts .... There is no justification for such treat-
ment unless one wants to dehumanize a young person in trouble and wants to
create more trouble with such person in the future.
Dr. Gould is an Associate Professor of Psychiatry at the New York University School of
Medicine and Director of Adolescent Services at Bellevue Psychiatric Hospital. Echoing
these views is Dr. Richard Feinberg, who directs the Bronx Childrens Psychiatric Hospi-
tal and is a member of the Task Force on Child Psychiatry of the American Psychiatric
Association.
I am wholly against the concept of punitive, prolonged isolation of chil-
dren, normal or aberrant in their behavioral development. While brief isola-
tion may be clinically indicated in both groups of youngsters, punitive pro-
longed isolation never can promote emotional development .... 322
F. Supp. at 482.
Finally, Dr. George L. Hardman, staff psychiatrist at Roxbury Court Clinic and consultant
to the Massachusetts Department of Youth Services stated,
It is my professional opinion that confining a child in isolation for punish-
ment serves no treatment purpose whatsoever. On the contrary, because the
child's problem or problems are in no way being dealt with during the period
in which he is confined in isolation, the child's behavior deteriorates rather
than improves in the course of his isolation. The isolation of a child only
inhibits that child's emotional development .... 346 F. Supp. at 1366.
The Affleck court also quotes from testimony to the same effect by Dr. Jerome Miller.
Commissioner. Department of Social Services for the Commonwealth of Massachusetts.
48 An ever-increasing number of experts have concurred in these views. The Depart-
ment of Health. Education and Welfare in 1962 announced standards for institutions
serving delinquents. Stating that the imposition of solitary confinement "rarely contributes
anything to treatment." it sought severely to restrict its use. The Department characterized
the use of such a measure as "an extremely severe type of punishment for a hyperactive
delinquent." See DEP'T OF HEALTH. EDUCATION AND WELFARE, INSTITUTIONS SERVING
DELINQUENT CHILDREN 124 (1962). More recently. the National Advisory Commission
on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals labeled isolation as "inhumane" and commented
that solitary confinement "in the long run brutalizes those who impose it as it brutalizes
those upon whom it is imposed." NATIONAL ADVISORY COMM'N ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE
STANDARDS AND GOALS, CORRECTIONS TASK FORCE REPORT, Standard 2 (1973). In-
stances of suicide and suicide attempts by youths in solitary confinement have also begun
to surface. See, e.g., Hearings on S. 48 Before the Subcomm. to Investigate Juvenile
Delinquency of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 91 st Cong., I Sess., vol. 5, at 5077
(1969); Konopka, Our Outcast Youth, 15 SOCIAL WORK 76 (1970). In her book
about adolescent females. Gisela Konopka. Professor of Social Work and Director of the
Center for Youth Development and Research at the University of Minnesota, has stated
the problem poignantly:
Even the highly motivated person, the person who is willing to suffer for an
ideal, feels degraded and abandoned because of the segregation from any
[VOL. 7:242
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In light of such testimony and supporting data, the prolonged
isolation of juveniles is clearly punitive in nature and without
sustainable justification in a system committed to a rehabilitative
goal. Isolation of juveniles may be illegal on two separate
grounds. First, it may constitute cruel and unusual punishment
when judged by a standard which is much less tolerant than that
imposed with respect to adults. Second, since juvenile com-
mitment is based on the assumption that treatment will be pro-
vided, due process is violated if punitive segregation, serving no
rehabilitative purpose, is imposed upon juvenile inmates.
II. FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION: MAIL
A. Present State of the Law
A prisoner has no absolute right to use the mails or to receive
an unlimited, unrestricted amount of mail from any source. 49
Many correctional institutions regularly read and censor all in-
coming and outgoing inmate mail. 50 Administrative restrictions
relating to the mails have often been endorsed as a necessary
incidence of prison life and regularly upheld where reasonably
related to the needs of administering the institution and maintain-
ing prison discipline. Thus, regulations preventing subversive, 51
inflammatory, 52 or reasonably objectionable 53 mail from entering
the prisons have been approved. Outgoing letters containing in-
accuracies, lies, or critical remarks about the institution or its
administration are often rejected and returned to the inmate. 54
Thus concern for the maintenance of institutional norms serves to
justify the imposition of limitations on a prisoner's right of free
expression.
Several courts have questioned the need for, and con-
stitutionality of such restrictions on incoming mail. Long v. Park-
human being. How much more does this apply to those who have not chosen
a certain way of life and to whom the suffering is not part of a conscious
decision?
G. KONOPKA, THE ADOLESCENT GIRL IN CONFLICT 113 (1966).
49 Lee v. Tahash. 352 F.2d 970 (8th Cir. 1965); Ortega v. Ragen, 216 F.2d 561 (7th Cir.
1954), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 940 (1955).5 0Jacob, Prison Discipline and Inmate Rights, 5 HARV. Civ. RIGHTS-CIv. LIB. L. REV.
227, 237 (1970). See also Nelson v. Heyne, 355 F. Supp. 451 (N.D. Ind. 1972).
51 Rivers v. Royster, 360 F.2d 592 (4th Cir. 1966).52 Walker v. Blackwell, 411 F.2d 23 (5th Cir. 1969) (Court held that prison officials
could act to prevent inmate prison violence by taking action against the introduction of a
Black Muslim newspaper if it had a substantially inflammatory effect on prison inmates.).53 Jackson v. Godwin, 400 F.2d 529 (5th Cir. 1968).54 Goldfarb & Singer, Redressing Prisoners' Grievances, 39 G EO. WASH. L. REV. 307
(1970).
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er5 5 held that where prisoners of other faiths are allowed to
receive literature, Muslims may not be denied the same right
unless the authorities can demonstrate that the literature presents
a "clear and present danger" to prison discipline. Similarly,
United States ex rel. Shakur v. Commissioner of Corrections5 6
affirmed the right of Black Panthers to receive and read the party
newspaper, although officials retained discretion to decide when
the Panthers could read it and to whom it could be disseminated.
In addition, the National Conference on Criminal Justice has
stated that free expression in prisons should not be restricted in
order to protect other offenders from unpopular ideas or to pro-
tect other offenders from views correctional officials deem not
conducive to rehabilitation. 57 The district court case of Palm-
igiano v. Travisono58 represents the most radical departure from
traditional reasoning regarding a prisoner's right of free ex-
pression. Basing the decision on the freedom of publishers to
circulate materials, the judge enjoined prison officials from screen-
ing out any printed matter except hard-core pornography. The
court in Palmigiano also forbade prison officials from reading any
correspondence from sources on the prisoner's approved mailing
list, although officials remained free to search the mail for con-
traband. Officials were required to treat letters from attorneys,
courts, and public officials in a like manner. Recent decisions have
tended to follow the lead of Palmigiano. In both Morales v.
Schmidt59 and Nelson v. Heyne,60 the courts characterized the
prisoner's right to free correspondence by mail as "fundamental"
and barred interference with that right absent the showing of a
compelling governmental interest.
Certain restrictions on outgoing correspondence have also been
upheld as justified. These restrictions include those aimed at pre-
venting the perfection of escape plans, forbidding correspondence
with persons whom the prison officials feel will inhibit the in-
mate's rehabilitation, 61 or limiting the number of people to whom
a prisoner may write.62 One court has even refused to invalidate a
regulation forbidding correspondence with anyone not specifically
55 390 F.2d 816 (3d Cir. 1968). See also Walker v. Blackwell, 411 F.2d 23 (5th Cir.
1969).
56303 F. Supp. 303 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
57 WORKING PAPERS FOR THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE: CORREC-
TIONAL INSTITUTIONS, Standard 2.15 (1973).
58317 F. Supp. 776 (D.R.I. 1970).
59 340 F. Supp. 544 (W.D. Wis. 1972).
60355 F. Supp. 451 (N.D. Ind. 1972).
61 Fussa v. Taylor, 168 F. Supp. 302 (M.D. Pa. 1958) (Court upheld warden's actions in
barring mail to a woman the prisoner claimed as a common law wife.).
62 Lee v. Tahash. 352 F.2d 970 (8th Cir. 1965).
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permitted as a correspondent by statute.63 However, the routine
censorship of outgoing mail in federal prisons was abolished in
1962.64 Further, Palmigiano, Morales, and Nelson enjoined pri-
son officials from opening, reading, or inspecting any outgoing
mail without a search warrant. The court in Palmigiano explicitly
rejected the idea that prison officials have any duty or right to
protect the public from the contents of letters written by inmates.
Restrictions on correspondence to public officials, courts, and
attorneys are of particular concern, and have been subjected to
more rigid judicial scrutiny. Not only are the first amendment
rights of prisoners involved, but such restrictions may deprive the
public of information necessary for it to carry out its watchdog
role. The ability to communicate with those on the outside acts as
an effective outlet for airing legitimate inmate grievances, and is a
necessity if the individual's right of access to the court is to be
meaningful. 5 A number of courts have now ruled that the in-
terruption or censorship of mail addressed to public officials rep-
resents an unconstitutional infringement on the prisoner's first
amendment rights.66 The right of prisoner access to the courts has
long been recognized; 67 its efficacy depends largely on the right of
the individual to communicate freely and privately with the court
and his attorney. Consequently, the courts have held that both the
due process clause and the equal protection clause of the
fourteenth amendment prohibit any restrictions on correspond-
ence addressed to the courts. 68 Correspondence with an inmate's
63 Labat v. McKeithen. 361 F.2d 757 (5th Cir. 1966).
64 D. GLASER, THE EFFECTIVENESS OF A PRISON AND PAROLE SYSTEM 123 (1964).
6 Three separate grounds exist to support that right. First, the ability to complain to
state and federal officials is an inseparable part of the right to petition for a redress of
grievances. Second, as employees entrusted by the public with the responsibility for prison
administration, corrections officials should not be allowed to interdict communications
alleging abuse of that trust. Third, denial of the right to uncensored communications with
public officials serves no rational public interest and is, therefore, an arbitrary exercise of
power prohibited by the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. Hirschkop &
Millemann, supra note 12, at 825. The authors point out that the federal system allows
uncensored mail to be sent to specified public officials, and forbids the reading of mail to
attorneys, with no apparent detriment to the system. Id.
66 Roberts v. Pegelow, 313 F.2d 548 (4th Cir. 1963); Landman v. Royster. 333 F. Supp.
621 (E.D. Va. 1971); Palmigiano v. Travisono, 317 F. Supp. 776 (D.R.I. 1970); Sostre v.
Rockefeller, 312 F. Supp. 863 (S.D.N.Y. 1970); Contra, Haas v. United States. 344 F.2d
56 (8th Cir. 1965); Brabson v. Wilkins. 19 N.Y.2d 433. 227 N.E.2d 383, 280 N.Y.S.2d
561 (1967).67 Ex parte Hull, 312 U.S. 546 (1941) (Court declared invalid a state regulation that
habeas corpus petitions must be approved by the parole board's "legal investigator" as
properly drawn before transmittal to the court.).
6 8 Dowd v. United States ex rel. Cook. 340 U.S. 206 (195 1) (Prison regulations may not
prevent an inmate from filing a timely appeal.); Lee v. Tahash, 352 F.2d 970 (8th Cir.
1965); Smartt v. Avery, 370 F.2d 788, 790 (6th Cir. 1967) (Court declared invalid a parole
board rule which delayed for a year a prisoner's parole board hearing whenever he sought
a writ of habeas corpus.).
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attorney has also received special consideration. Most courts
agree that it is impermissible for prison officials to censor or
refuse to send mail to the inmate's attorney. 69 Nolan v. Scafati70
specifically held that, absent countervailing interests, a state can-
not prevent an inmate from seeking legal assistance from a bona
fide attorney. An allegation by prison officials that the letter
contained "lies" was held insufficient to justify its not being
mailed. 71 Few courts, however, would go as far as Palmigiano
and expressly forbid prison officials from reading inmate letters
before they are sent.
While the judiciary has traditionally been reluctant to recognize
an absolute right of prisoners to send or receive mail, recent court
opinions dealing with this subject have evinced a heightened rec-
ognition of the fundamental nature of that right and displayed
increased judicial reluctance to defer to the judgment of correc-
tional officials. The impetus for this departure from established
doctrine would seem to be the recognition that there can be little
tolerance of official interference with correspondence, especially
with material addressed to public officials, attorneys, or the
courts, if the prisoner is to retain all rights save those society has
specifically taken away.
B. The Legality of the Practice in a
Juvenile Setting
While a balancing of competing considerations in the juvenile
setting would seem to demand that the restrictions on inmate
correspondence be identical to those promulgated in the adult
correctional setting, the special status of juvenile institutions dedi-
69See, e.g., Palmigiano v. Travisono, 317 F. Supp. 776 (D.R.I. 1970),'Sostre v. Rock-
efeller, 312 F. Supp. 863 (S.D.N.Y. 1970). Contra, Brabson v. Wilkins, 19 N.Y.2d 433,
227 N.E.2d 383, 280 N.Y.S.2d 561 (1967).
70430 F.2d 548 (1st Cir. 1970).
71 The danger in permitting prison officials to read outgoing mail addressed to the courts
lies in the possible "chilling effect" it may have on the prisoner. While disciplinary action
is not allowed in retaliation for prisoner allegations of mistreatment by prison officials.
reprisals can result when prison authorities are alerted tO the prisoner's action by reading
his mail. See United States ex rel. Cleggett v. Pate, 229 F. Supp. 818, 821-22 (N.D. Ill.
1964). District Judge Motley expressed the belief, in Sostre v. Rockefeller, 3 12 F. Supp.
863 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) that prison officials had fabricated a bogus excuse to put Sostre in
solitary confinement in order to punish him for obtaining a court order releasing him from a
previous punitive confinement. These dangers are enhanced by the proof problems in-
volved and by the fact that most correctional institutions do not give an inmate a full
hearing before punishment is administered. The court in Talley v. Stephens, 247 F. Supp.
683 (E.D. Ark. 1965), acknowledged the seriousness of the problem of reprisals by noting
that "a theoretical right of access to the Courts is hardly actual and adequate if its exercise
is likely to produce reprisals, physical or otherwise, from Penitentiary personnel." Id. at
690.
[VOL. 7:242
Juvenile Rights
cated to rehabilitation rather than punishment means that the
treatment justification given for many of the restrictions deserves
special consideration. It seems logical that the staff should be
aware of any material discussed in an incoming letter which would
greatly upset the youth. Also if it can be demonstrated that
reading the youth's general outgoing correspondence makes the
staff better able to relate to the youth's needs, there may be an
argument to support this action.
There is no justification, however, for treating an adolescent's
correspondence with the courts, his attorney, or public officials
other than in conformity with the standard enunciated for adult
prisoners. No rational nexus exists between a legitimate purpose
or goal of the institution and the censorship of mail to an attorney
or a court. The argument that screening of "official" mail allows
the administrators to deal more efficiently with the problem, at an
earlier stage and in a more informal manner, is no more appealing
in this situation than in an adult prison and is fraught with the
same potential for abuse. Additionally, the National Conference
on Criminal Justice has recently agreed that administrative in-
convenience and cost are inadequate justifications for any first
amendment restrictions. 72 A policy more closely in line with that
enuciated by the National Conference 73 and Palmigiano, allowing
mail to be inspected for contraband but not read for content, is
desirable, especially for all correspondence to an attorney, the
court, or public officials. In any case, mail addressed to officials
who are concerned with a youth's confinement or treatment
should never be censored or delayed by institutional officials.
II1. POST-ADJUDICATIVE DUE PROCESS
IN THE JUVENILE CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTION
A. Present State of he Law
Any discussion of due process rights of institutionally confined
juveniles subject to administrative disciplinary decisions is com-
plicated by the traditional freedom granted juvenile correctional
administrators and the limitation of In re Gault74 that the due
process standards of the juvenile justice system are applicable
solely to the adjudicatory stage. Furthermore, analogy to the
present state of the law in the adult correctional setting is com-
72 WORKING PAPERS FOR THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE: CORREC-
TIONAL INSTITUTIONS. Standard 2.15 (1973).73 Id. at Standard 2.17.
74387 U.S. 1 (1967).
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plicated by the Supreme Court's pronouncement in McKeiver v.
Pennsylvania75 that, despite In re Gault, the full range of due
process protections given an individual in an adult criminal pro-
ceeding need not be applied in the juvenile setting. Nonetheless,
the reasoning that motivated the court in In re Gault is equally
applicable at the post-adjudicative stage. 76 This has been recog-
nized by at least three federal district courts that have recently
examined the rights of juveniles confined in a post-adjudicatory
juvenile institution and insisted on some form of procedural pro-
tection for incarcerated juveniles. 77
The juvenile institution presents variations from the adult cor-
rections model which must be considered in delineating the role of
due process protections within the institution. The very age of the
individuals involved creates a situation where some sanctions
such as solitary confinement may have a decidedly more serious
effect than on an adult. In addition, the non-criminal nature of the
juvenile's confinement may require the provision of additional
protective procedures before he is transferred from one institution
to another.
In the following discussion, the rights of mentally ill individuals
involuntarily committed to mental institutions for treatment pur-
poses are examined to provide an analogy to civil incarceration of
juveniles. The Circuit Court of Appeals for the District of Colum-
bia has consistently held that decisions that affect the rights and
liberties of the patient and are justified with reference to a reha-
bilitative goal, are subject to judicial review to "make sure the
[hospital] has made a permissible and reasonable decision in view
of the relevant information and within a broad range of dis-
cretion." 78 In each case, the court acknowledged that it could not
and should not decide what treatment was best for the patient, but
recognized that to afford no procedural protections in the form of
judicial review would be "to abandon the interests affected to the
absolute power of administrative officials." 79 This the court re-
7-402 U.S. 528 (1971). While recognizing that certain due process procedural
safeguards are applicable to juvenile proceedings, the Court held that there is no con-
stitutional right to a jury trial in juvenile court.
76 In writing for the Court, Mr. Justice Fortas observed: "[W]hile these cases relate only
to restricted aspects of the subject, they unmistakably indicate that, whatever may be their
precise impact, neither the fourteenth amendment nor the Bill of Rights is for adults
alone." 387 U.S. at 13.
77Nelson v. Heyne, 355 F. Supp. 451 (N.D. Ind. 1972); Inmates of the Boys' Training
School v. Affleck, 346 F. Supp. 1354 (D.R.I. 1972); Lollis v. New York State Dep't of
Social Services, 322 F. Supp. 473 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).78 Williams v. Robinson, 432 F.2d 637 (D.C. Cir. 1970); Covington v. Harris. 419 F.2d
617 (D.C. Cir. 1969); Tribby v. Cameron, 379 F.2d 104. 105 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
79 Covington v. Harris, 419 F.2d 617, 621 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
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fused to do, despite the fact that many of these decisions resulted
from challenges to administrative actions prescribing the treat-
ment of individuals civilly committed for rehabilitative purposes.
Much of the discussion that follows concerns decisions in juve-
nile institutions relating more closely to discipline than to treat-
ment, thereby creating an even greater justification for close judi-
cial examination of the administrative decision-making process.
Expert testimony reveals that procedures in even the better juve-
nile institutions cannot always be categorized as treat-
ment-oriented.80 The judicial imperative was best stated by the
court in Landman v. Royster 8' in the context of disciplinary
procedures in an adult prison setting: " 'Security' or 'treatment'
are not shibboleths to justify any treatment." 82
Notwithstanding the acknowledged general application of the
fifth and fourteenth amendments, courts have traditionally failed
to impose procedural requirements on administrative decisions
regarding prison discipline. 83 Until recently, little concern was
demonstrated for procedural regularity in non-parole or release
situations, in spite of the fact that disciplinary action often directly
affected an inmate's liberty. Courts would regularly justify the
denial of a petition alleging arbitrary loss of good time 84 or trans-
fer to tighter security 85 because such actions were deemed to
involve matters of privilege rather than right. As a result of this
prevailing judicial disinclination, many American correctional in-
stitutions failed to adopt procedures designed to protect prisoners
from arbitrary disciplinary actions by correctional administrators.
In many states there is no requirement that a hearing be held
before an inmate is placed in solitary confinement. 86 Prison dis-
ciplinary measures are often summarily administered for the viola-
tion of what may be an unwritten regulation. 87 A series of recent
80 See notes 47-48 and accompanying text supra.
81 333 F. Supp. 621 (E.D. Va. 1971).
82 Id. at 645.
83 For example, Banning v. Looney, 213 F.2d 771 (10th Cir. 1954). (The court declared
itself without power to supervise prison administrators or to interfere with the ordinary
prison rules and regulations.).
84 Douglas v. Sigler, 386 F.2d 684 (8th Cir. 1967); Brown v, Warden, 351 F.2d 564 (7th
Cir. 1965); Hiatt v. Campagna, 178 F.2d 42 (5th Cir. 1949), aff'd per curiam, 340 U.S.
880 (1950). In all three cases the courts declared that the grant or denial of good time
credit was a discretionary power of the executive prison administrative officer. Good time
is defined as accumulated credit for good behavior, the acquisition of which is necessary to
obtain parole eligibility.
81 Bundy v. Cannon, 328 F. Supp. 165. 173 (D. Md. 1971).
86Goldfarb & Singer. Redressing Prisoners Grievances, 39 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 176,
233 (1970).
87 Id. at 192. In Courtney v. Bishop, 409 F.2d 1185 (8th Cir.). cert. denied, 396 U.S.
915 (1969). the court rejected a prisoner's complaint that he should have been given a
hearing before his placement in solitary confinement where no such hearing was authorized
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cases reject, to varying degrees, the tradition of automatic judicial
deference to the disciplinary decisions of prison officials and sub-
ject disciplinary procedures within correctional institutions to in-
creased scrutiny. Collectively they hold that prison administrators
must observe at least minimal impartial procedures before impos-
ing substantial punishment upon an inmate for a rule infraction.
Among the first cases to discard explicitly the "hands-off"
doctrine regarding prison disciplinary procedures was Morris v.
Travisono.88 The court in Morris, appeared to follow the lead of
the Fifth Circuit which wrote in Jackson v. Godwin,89 "Even
prisoners have the constitutional right-a right to due process of
law-to be free of arbitrary actions affecting their liberties." 90 In
Landman v. Peyton,9 1 the Fourth Circuit refused to sanction the
system employed in a Virginia prison whereby untrained,
lower-rank personnel were granted wholesale discretion in the
administration of the disciplinary cell blocks. The due process
objection centered on concern for prisoner exposure to the capri-
cious imposition of added punishment. Despite the fears of some
commentators that the introduction of adversary proceedings into
corrections will impair correctional efficiency and public safety,9 2
it is now clear that where a substantial interest is involved, in-
mates of a state correctional institution may not be subjected to
arbitrary and summary action on the part of prison officials.
Not surprisingly, this trend has burgeoned simultaneously with
the Supreme Court's reiteration of the importance of fair proce-
dures in all administrative settings in which significant depriva-
tions of life, liberty, or property are possible. The decision in
Goldberg v. Kelly 93 typifies this trend. The Supreme Court de-
clared invalid a provision which cut off funds to welfare recipients
without the grant of minimal pre-termination procedural
by the prison rules. A recent study of the U.S. Penitentiary at Atlanta. Georgia discovered
that although an inmate will appear before a disciplinary board for a serious rule violation,
he will not receive notice in advance of the charge, nor will he be allowed to call any
witness in his behalf, to cross-examine the officer alleging the misconduct, or to retain
counsel. Jacob, supra note 50, at 232 -33 (1970).
88310 F. Supp. 857 (D.R.I. 1970). Plaintiff prisoner brought a civil rights suit pursuant
to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 on behalf of himself and his fellow inmates challenging the con-
stitutionality and statutory permissibility of rules, procedures, and conditions at the Adult
Correctional Institutions at Cranston, Rhode Island.
a 400 F.2d 529 (5th Cir. 1968). Plaintiff, a state prison inmate, claimed that prison rules
and regulations denying him the right to receive Negro newspapers and magazines because
he was Negro deprived him of equal protection of the law.9 0 Id. at 533.
91 370 F.2d 135 (4th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 388 U.S. 920 (1967).
92 Burdman. The Conflict Between Freedom and Order, 15 CRIME AND DELINQUENCY,
371 (1969).
93397 U.S. 254 (1970).
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safeguards. The interest of the welfare recipient, the court found,
was not outweighed by the interest of the state in instituting
summary proceedings. Increasingly, as the question becomes not
whether any due process procedural safeguards are required be-
fore action is taken which significantly affects the liberty of a
prisoner, but rather what procedures and protections will be ade-
quate to meet applicable constitutional imperatives, courts and
authors are turning to the concepts that govern the administrative
process throughout government to guide their actions in the pri-
son context. Because due process is a flexible concept, the re-
quirements of which vary in different situations depending on
different factors, it is important to delineate the considerations
used by courts in formulating due process standards in the correc-
tional setting.
Weighing the institutional need for flexibility to preserve dis-
cipline and staff morale together with increased demands for a
stricter rule of law in prison procedures, one commentator has
suggested that the guiding principle should be "the greater the
impact on the conditions of present or prospective liberty, or the
physical or psychiatric integrity of the prisoner, the greater (or
more plausible) the claim to substantive and procedural
safeguards." 94 The reasoning of the court in Cafeteria and Res-
taurant Workers Union v. McElroy 5 is consistent with this prin-
ciple.
[Clonsideration of what procedures due process may require
under a given set of circumstances must begin with a determi-
nation of the precise nature of the government function in-
volved as well as of the private interest that has been affected
by governmental action.9 6
In Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath,97 Justice
Frankfurter more specifically delineated the factors considered in
determining the extent to which due process must be afforded a
recipient of governmental action. He wrote:
The precise nature of the interest that has been adversely
affected, the manner in which this was done. the reasons for
doing it. the available alternatives to the procedure that was
followed, the protection implicit in the office of the function-
94 JOINT COMM'N ON CORRECTIONAL MANPOWER AND TRAINING. THE LEGAL CHAL-
LENGE TO CORRECTIONS: IMPLICATIONS FOR MANPOWER AND TRAINING 78 (1969).
95 367 U.S. 886 (1961).
'3 Id. at 895.
97 341 U.S. 123 (195 1).
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ary whose conduct is challenged, the balance of hurt com-
plained of and good accomplished-these are some of the
considerations that must enter into the judicial judgment.98
In sum, the three factors stressed are the nature of the particular
government interest involved, the interest of the government in
having a summary proceeding, and the interest of the private
party which is placed in jeopardy by the governmental act.
One of the most important cases in this area is Sostre v.
Rockefeller.9 Sostre, the plaintiff-inmate, had been placed in sol-
itary confinement and denied over 100 days "good time" without
prior benefit of hearing or written notice of the charges against
him. The district court ordered that before a prisoner can be sent
to punitive segregation, he must receive advance written notice of
the charges against him including the rule or regulation he is
charged with violating, be given a recorded hearing before a
disinterested official, have the opportunity to cross-examine ad-
verse witnesses and to call witnesses in his own behalf, and be
permitted to retain counsel or to appoint a voluntary counsel
substitute. In addition, the district court judge provided that the
prisoner must receive a written decision of the proceeding which
briefly sets forth the evidence upon which it is based, the reasons
for the decision, and the legal basis for the punishment imposed.
On appeal, the Second Circuit felt that full trial-type procedures
were unnecessary and reversed the lower court decision. 10 0 While
agreeing that a prisoner is not subject to the capricious and
arbitrary actions of prison officials, the court felt that due process
was satisfied if the procedures utilized guaranteed that all dis-
ciplinary action would be "premised on facts rationally deter-
mined." 10 1 Accordingly, the court required that before dis-
ciplinary action having a substantial effect on the prisoner may be
taken, he must be confronted with the accusation, informed of the
evidence against him, and afforded a reasonable opportunity to
explain his actions.
Sostre is not an isolated example of a court's becoming in-
timately involved in the elaboration of precise internal in-
stitutional procedures. A number of courts have insisted on proce-
dural protections more in line with those required by the district
98 Id. at 163.
99312 F. Supp. 863 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) modified, affid in part, rev'd in part sub nom.
Sostre v. McGinnis, 442 F.2d 178 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1049 (1972).
10 0Sostre v. McGinnis, 442 F.2d 178 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1049
(1972).
101 442 F.2d at 198.
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court in Sostre.10 2 Last year the Third Circuit declared that before
a prisoner could be transfered to solitary confinement the
fourteenth amendment required that he receive a hearing and
pre-hearing notice of the charges against him.103 Landman v.
Royster'0 4 is of particular interest because the district court care-
fully considered, enunciated, and balanced the interests of the
prisoner and the state in the initiation and implementation of
intra-institutional disciplinary actions before announcing separate
procedures for minor violations and major violations. For dis-
ciplinary action which could result in solitary confinement, max-
imum security confinement, or loss of good time, the court or-
dered full trial-type proceedings because a possible loss of sub-
stantial privileges was involved. 10 5 In addition to evaluating the
impact of increased restrictions on the prisoner's movement, the
court considered the effect of the action on the prisoner's diet, his
opportunity to work, his access to religious services, educational
opportunity, and the library, and his chances for parole and pos-
sible loss of "good time." Although the court did not require the
same panoply of procedures for violations resulting in less severe
deprivations, such as restrictions on use of the commissary or
recreation facilities, adherence to minimal procedures consisting
of verbal notice of the charges, a hearing before an impartial
decision-maker, and the right to present testimony and
cross-examine adverse witnesses was ordered in order to prevent
arbitrary administrative action. 10 6 Significantly, Landman v. Roy-
ster and Sostre v. Rockefeller have also re-evaluated the tradition-
al right-privilege doctrine in the prison context. Under the
right-privilege doctrine states were able to avoid providing due
process guarantees by labeling a state benefit a "privilege" rather
1
0 2 Nolan v. Scafati. 430 F.2d 548 (1st Cir. 1970) (required assurances of elemental
fairness when substantial individual interests are at stake); Clutchette v. Procunier. 328
F. Supp. 767 (N.D. Cal. 1971) (required notice. hearing before an impartial tribunal, right
to present evidence and cross-examine witnesses, counsel or lay substitute. and written
fact findings); Bundy v. Cannon. 328 F. Supp. 165 (D. Md. 1971) (full trial-type proce-
dures required for all major violations); Morris v. Travisono. 317 F. Supp. 857 (D.R.I.
1970).
103 Gray v. Creamer. 465 F.2d 179 (3d Cir. 1972).
104333 F. Supp. 621 (E.D. Va. 1971). In examining the adequacy of disciplinary
procedures in the Virginia prison system. the court relied heavily upon the reasoning of
both McElroy and McGrath.
15 Among the procedures required were: I) an oral hearing before an impartial tribunal.
2) prior notice of the substance of the factual charge, 3) a reasonable interval in which to
allow the prisoner to prepare for the hearing. 4) an opportunity to cross-examine adverse
witnesses. 5) right to a lay advisor, or when the "loss of substantial rights" are involved, an
attorney, and 6) a written decision based solely upon evidence presented at the hearing. Id.
at 653- 54.
106 Id.
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than a "right." Citing Shapiro v. Thompson,10 7 Landman ex-
plicitly rejects the doctrine and holds that benefits authorized by
statelaw may not be arbitrarily denied. In Sostre the court wrote,
"The exaction of segregated confinement was onerous indeed, and
the distinction between a 'right' and a 'privilege'-or between
'liberty' and a 'privilege' for that matter-is nowhere more mean-
ingless than behind prison walls."' 10 8
In sum, recent decisions, with increasingly stronger language,
have tended to emphasize the constitutional necessity of provid-
ing prisoners with adequate due process protection. While due
process considerations have traditionally had little impact on ad-
ministrative decisions imposing prison discipline, an emerging ju-
dicial reluctance to defer to the judgment of prison administrators
coupled with the realization that the dictates of due process are
equally applicable to inmates has resulted in a judicial re-
examination of the role of due process in the post-adjudicative
correctional setting. The demise of the ight-privilege doctrine
leaves courts free to weigh and balance the respective interests
involved. Applying this mode of analysis, the question is no
longer whether due process requirements are applicable, but
rather what procedures will comport with due process in the
imposition of specific disciplinary measures.
B. The Legality of the Practice in a
Juvenile Setting
The eventual effect on juvenile institutions of the trend toward
increased due process protection is unclear. Lollis and Affleck
demonstrate that the issue here, as in the adult correctional set-
ting, will not be centered around whether due process applies, but
rather what procedures adequately satisfy its requirements. There
can be no doubt that the juvenile has substantial interests at stake.
A juvenile has no statutory right to a reduction in his length of
confinement based on an accumulation of "good time." Never-
theless, disciplinary action has a profound effect on the length of
the juvenile's commitment because his confinement, while limited
in time to the period of his legal classification as a juvenile, is of
indefinite duration since it is directly tied to estimates of the
extent of his reform and rehabilitation. Further, the effect of the
imposition of disciplinary sanctions on the attainment of rehabil-
itative goals is unmistakable. It has already been demonstrated
107394 U.S. 618 (1969).
108442 F.2d at 196.
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that punitive measures, such as denial of recreational or educa-
tional privileges, or utilization of solitary confinement, may have a
significantly more detrimental effect on the juvenile than similar
sanctions imposed on adults. 10
Arguments for procedural protection are tempered by the fears
of some administrators of treatment-oriented institutions that the
introduction of procedural requirements will destroy the thera-
peutic character of their programs. 110 The fear is two-pronged.
First, administrators argue that the system causes undesirable
rigidity, decreasing staff flexibility in coping with new situations as
they occur. Second, it is argued that the system creates an atmo-
sphere and attitude that is detrimental to treatment and prob-
lem-solving. In addition, the continued utility of group therapy,
recently introduced as part of the treatment program in some
institutions, may be jeopardized by strict application of due pro-
cess requirements.' 1 ' In light of these legitimate expressions of
concern, attorneys and judiciary alike must be aware that the
introduction of formal adversary procedures may at times be
counter-productive to the provision of treatment in the juvenile
correctional setting. However, this does not mean that due pro-
cess considerations are any less relevant. Incarcerated juveniles
must be protected against arbitrary action and cannot be left at
the mercy of the good faith of institutional administrators.
It is imperative that minimal due process procedures be estab-
lished at some level within each juvenile institution. While such
procedures should be designed to facilitate the on-going treatment
process, the youth is entitled to demand that there be a published
set of rules enunciating basic disciplinary policy together with
potential sanctions; that he be granted a fair and impartial hearing
before a disinterested officer prior to the imposition of punish-
ment; and that, where the sanction proposed is serious, he be
provided with some form of adequate representation. While ex-
perimentation in the provision of treatment must be encouraged,
the basic procedural protection of an incarcerated youth cannot
be ignored.
109 See notes 47-48 and accompanying text supra.
110This view has been expressed by several administrators of juvenile correctional
institutions. See Reed, Gault and the Juvenile Training School, 43 IND. L. J. 641 (1968).
1 In cases in which such treatment is employed, an individual's disciplinary restriction
will often be subjected to discussion and review by his group. Not only must the dis-
ciplined member explain the incident, but the group, in turn. is under an obligation to
question him fully and responsibly about it. and to ask how it affects the individual's
rehabilitative goals and the goals of the group as a whole. Information concerning group
therapy treatment was gathered from observations and interviews at the Green Oak
Center, a maximum security juvenile institution locatedin Whitmore Lake, Michigan.
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Finally, while it is clear that adult prisoners have no legal right
to remain in a minimum as opposed to a maximum security pri-
son, 112 there exists both a statutory and constitutional argument
that a juvenile is entitled to the least restrictive confinement that
concerns for public safety will allow. Many state statutes enun-
ciate this goal by emphasizing the need for keeping the child in the
home or its nearest equivalent.113 This concept is based on the
premise that where a person's liberty is restricted for a purpose
other than punishment and by a procedure less than that required
for a criminal conviction, due process demands that treatment
must be dispensed in the least restrictive setting and manner
commensurate with the purpose of the commitment. If this right
exists, a juvenile must be afforded a reasonable opportunity to
challenge the decision to transfer him to a maximum security
institution where his freedom of movement will be greatly cur-
tailed.
A series of cases involving the rights of non-criminal, in-
voluntarily committed mental patients have explicitly held that
these patients have a right to be confined only to the extent
absolutely necessary for their proper treatment and the public
safety.11 4 The factors that were determinative in each of the cases
involving mental patients are equally applicable to juveniles.
Neither individual has been convicted of a crime, while both have
been confined primarily for purposes of treatment. The court in
Covington v. Harris1 15 phrased the legal argument succinctly:
[T]he principle of the least restrictive alternative consistent
with the legitimate purposes of a commitment inheres in the
very nature of civil commitment, which entails an extraor-
112 Gray v. Creamer, 465 F.2d 179, 187 (3d Cir. 1972); Bundy v. Cannon, 328 F. Supp.
165, 173 (D. Md. 1971). Cases such as Gray and Bundy have consistently held that adult
prisoners have no constitutional right to procedural due process in challenging a prison
transfer. An exception to this general rule was recently enunciated in Gomes v. Travisono,
41 U.S.L.W. 2413 (D.R.I. 1973). In Gomes, the court held that in light of the protections
offered prisoners in Morris v. Travisono, 317 F. Supp. 857 (D.R.I. 1970), disciplinary
transfer of adult prisoners without a due process hearing violated the equal protection
clause. The National Conference on Criminal Justice has also expressed the view that
institutional transfers should be the subject of more rigid procedural scrutiny. WORKING
PAPERS FOR THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE: CORRECTIONAL IN-
STITUTIONS, Standard 2.13 (1973).
113See note 3 and accompanying text supra. Several states have adopted minimum
security programs in an effort to maintain the child in the community. In re Arnold, 12 Md.
App. 384, 278 A.2d 658 (Md. Ct. Sp. App. 1971); Hill v. State, 454 S.W.2d 429 (Tex. Ct.
App. 1970); State v. Braun, 145 N.W.2d 482 (N.D. 1966); (All three cases held that
children must not be transplanted away from their families and communities when their
treatment needs could be served just as well outside a training school.).1t4Jones v. Robinson, 440 F.2d 249 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Williams v. Robinson, 432 F.2d
637 (D.C. Cir. 1970); Dixon v. Jacobs, 427 F.2d 589 (D.C. Cir. 1970); Covington v.
Harris, 419 F.2d 617 (D.C. Cir. 1969); Lake v. Cameron, 364 F.2d 657 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
11419 F.2d 617 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
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dinary deprivation of liberty justifiable only when the respon-
dent is 'mentally ill to the extent that he is likely to injure
himself or other persons if allowed to remain at liberty.' A
statute sanctioning such a drastic curtailment of the rights of
citizens must be narrowly, even grudgingly, construed in or-
der to avoid deprivations of liberty without due process of
law."16
The treatment motivation of the decision in cases like Covington
was not and should not be sufficient to bar judicial review of
administrative action if a severe loss of liberty is involved. On a
number of occasions the courts have expressed their particular
concern over the degree of confinement of a juvenile. In both
Affleck and Shone v. Mainen 7 transfer of a juvenile to an adult
correctional institution was forbidden without formal due process
protections. In light of this concern, and recent developments
enunciating the rights of the mentally ill, the undertaking of proce-
dural reform in the custodial placement of juveniles must be
considered as part of the larger goal of insuring that juvenile
inmates receive the procedural protection to which they are en-
titled.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
Any attempt by the judiciary to police the operation of the
juvenile corrections system involves the complex task of balanc-
ing the needs of a program ideally designed to be treat-
ment-oriented, against the rights of the individual youth in-
voluntarily confined in these institutions. Until recently, juvenile
institution administrators possessed virtually uncontrolled power.
Not only did the courts abstain from reviewing the actions of
these administrators, but most state legislatures granted them
broad discretionary powers with little or no guidance.1 1 8 The
recent action of the courts is only the initial step in bringing the
juvenile correctional process squarely within the rule of law and
determining what safeguards are necessary to ensure realization
of the systemic goals..
116 Id. at 623. Significantly, the petitioner in Covingtonwas questioning his transfer from
one ward in the mental institution to the maximum security area of the same facility. While
acknowledging the increased judicial difficulty in dealing with an intra-hospital disposition,
the court recognized its duty to guard against unwarranted deprivations of liberty both
before and after the patient enters the hospital.
17406 F.2d 844 (1st Cir.), vacated as moot, 396 U.S. 6 (1969) (held invalid the transfer
of a juvenile from a juvenile training center to a state prison for young adults because of a
failure to employ procedures required by due process, despite compliance with state law).
118Jacob, supra note 50, at 235. See also Goldfarb & Singer, Redressing Prisoners'
Grievances, 39GEo. WASH. L. REv.227 (1970).
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The emerging picture indicates that the demands of treatment
may justify a lesser standard of procedural due process in dis-
ciplinary proceedings while requiring increased due process pro-
tection surrounding the decision to transfer a youth to a maximum
security institution. However, there is no justification for relaxing
procedural due process requirements in juvenile institutions fo-
cusing primarily on custody rather than treatment. Further, there
is a strong argument that solitary confinement per se may be
unconstitutional in the juvenile setting, although solitary con-
finement of adults is permissible. Finally, there appears to be little
justification for a separate juvenile standard for resolution of first
amendment issues, except insofar as differentiation can be jus-
tified by reference to treatment objectives.
Correctional administrators must not be allowed to regain the
immunity from judicial scrutiny that they previously possessed.
There is no escaping the realities of the deprivation which may be
imposed on a juvenile. As the Supreme Court accurately recog-
nized in In re Gault:
The boy is committed to an institution where he may be
restrained of liberty for years. It is of no constitutional con-
sequence-and of limited practical meaning-that the in-
stitution to which he is committed is called an Industrial
School. The fact of the matter is that, however euphemistic
the title, a "receiving home" or an "industrial school" for
juveniles is an institution of confinement in which the child is
incarcerated for a greater or lesser time.119
-Matthew L. Myers*
119 387 U.S. at 27.
*J.D., 1973, University of Michigan.
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